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Energy and the Environment: Confronting Common
Threats to Security
Lakshman Guruswamy*
I. Introduction
The United States recently confronted and apparently overcame
a menacing threat to national and international security. The danger
encompassed both a threat to world peace and order from armed
aggression and military aggrandizement, as well as a threat to vital
sources of energy.
National security has traditionally been equated with the ability
of the United States to thwart armed aggression. However, the se-
curity umbrella is being enlarged. The Gulf War demonstrated that
national security also embraces a threat to our critical sources of en-
ergy. The National Energy Strategy of the United States recognizes
that economic prosperity and geopolitical power are dependent
upon energy.' Accordingly, the concept of national security has
been enlarged to embrace "energy security": the ability of this coun-
try to withstand disruptions to its sources of energy. 2 "Energy secur-
ity" has begun to permeate the discourse and argot of national
security.3
The successful completion of the Middle East war seems, at least
for the moment, to have interdicted the threats to military and en-
ergy security. Unfortunately, other less apparent but more insidious
and pervasive perils that constitute threats to our environmental se-
curity are often ignored. The most ominous of the many threats to
our environmental security advancing upon us is the danger of
global warming and climatic change. This Article recognizes that
global warming presents the greatest threat to environmental secur-
ity. It contends that the challenge to both energy and environmental
security can be traced to a common cause: our dependence on fossil
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona. I am indebted to Professors Charles Ares,
Dan Dobbs, Moe Litman, John Strong, Ted Schneyer, Dean Sullivan, and Robert Williams
for their comments on an earlier draft. I am also indebted to Dan Anderson, L3, for his
editorial help, and to my research assistant, Andrew Briggs, for his valuable assistance.
I DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY: FIRST EDITION 1991/1992
(1991) [hereinafter NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY].
2 Id. at 3.
3 Id. at 3-6.
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fuels. The need for energy security, in the light of our dependence
on imported oil,4 brought us to war in the Middle East, while our
unquestioning faith in coal and oil threatens our environmental se-
curity and has brought us to the brink of climatic change.
The intersection of the energy and environmental crises
presents a common challenge. This Article argues that since fossil
fuels are the root cause of the twin threats to national security, it is
necessary to forge common legal and policy responses capable of
meeting this challenge. We have an opportunity to redesign our en-
ergy and environmental policies in order to reduce dependence on
carbon-emitting fossil fuels. But rather than accentuate the threat to
our energy security from fossil fuel reliance, the success of the Gulf
War has, in fact, obscured the reality of that threat.
Climatic change cannot be perceived as clearly as military opera-
tions in the Gulf. The buildup of trace gases leading to global warm-
ing does not photograph or televise like the dramatic build up of
multinational forces in Saudi Arabia, the surgical precision of smart
bombs, or the destruction of the Iraqi army. To many in the United
States, the climatic threat moving inexorably towards us is only a dis-
tant, dim, and indeterminate possibility, compared to what we have
seen and heard of the reality of war. The euphoria of victory blurs
our perception of the real implications of the Gulf War, and the dan-
ger of global warming.
Furthermore, the Gulf War has camouflaged the true cost of oil.
While attention has been riveted on the military face of the Gulf cri-
sis, its flip side has generally been ignored. The Gulf imbroglio, cor-
rectly examined, exposes the extent to which the threat to energy
security arises from our dependence on imported oil. It also reveals
the actual cost of our reliance on fossil fuels. It is difficult to see how
a major part of the enormous military expenses and loss of life suf-
fered in the Gulf War can be excluded from any approximation of
the cost of oil. Moreover, it is becoming strikingly evident that a
continued and reliable flow of oil can only be assured by a perma-
nent United States or allied presence in the region.5 This will, of
course, entail further expenditure.
Currently, the United States enjoys incomparable international
stature. This country commands prestige and authority unparalleled
since the conclusion of the World War II. From his position as
leader of the world's greatest superpower, President Bush has been
contemplating the creation of a "new world order." This Article ar-
4 Our growing dependence on imported oil intensifies the national security risk of
relying on fossil fuels. Oil imports now constitute roughly 50% of U.S. consumption, up
73% in the past five years. Arizona Daily Star, Feb. 17, 1991, at 12, col. 2. The Depart-
ment of Energy projects that oil imports may reach 67% of U.S. consumption by the year
2010. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 1990 20 (1990).
5 Aho & Stokes, The Year the World Economy Turned, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 160, 162 (1990).
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gues that the time is right for the United States to take the vanguard
in fashioning this "new world order." The Article contends, how-
ever, that any new world order must not only include military and
energy security, but must unequivocally and decisively embrace envi-
ronmental security as well. The World Climate Convention (pres-
ently being negotiated) 6 and other bills presented to Congress
propose a 20% reduction of global warming by the year 2000. 7 Such
a reduction will advance environmental security.
IUnfortunately, the U.S. record in combatting the environmental
threat to security from global warming is replete with blemishes. For
over three years the international community of states has been ne-
gotiating a World Climate Treaty that is scheduled to be signed at
the Earth Summit in 1992.8 Most industrialized nations believe that
remedial action should be directed at the causes of global warming.
They envision a stabilization of carbon dioxide emissions, and subse-
quent reductions up to 20% or 30%, in order to avert the otherwise
inexorable march to tragedy.
During the negotiating process, the United States has wavered
over the need for action against global warming. Equivocal at best,
President Bush opposed urgent or decisive action to halt global
warming for two major reasons. First, he argued that placing emis-
sion limitations on carbon dioxide would interfere with economic
growth and the free market.9 Second, he contended that greater sci-
entific certainty was required before such drastic action could be
taken.' 0 Consequently, the United States has opposed proposals for
emission limitations." Not surprisingly, many European countries
maintained that the United States was turning a blind eye to the dan-
gers of global warming.' 2 During the 1990 economic summit con-
ference, European officials accused the United States of frustrating
6 See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
7 See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
8 Preparations for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment, or "Earth Summit," are underway and various regional meetings are scheduled to
take place in 1991. The UN Conference in Brazil Will Be the First "Earth Summit", UNEP NoRT
AMERICA NEws 2 (Dec. 1990).
9 Shabecoff, Bush Asks Cautious Response To Threat of Global Warming, N.Y. Times, Feb.
6, 1990, at Al, col. 5. President Bush's Chief of Staff John Sununu capitalized on the
American people's distaste for bureaucracy in rejecting the EPA's more rigorous stance on
global warming last year. He claimed to counterbalance "a little tendency by some of the
faceless bureaucrats on the environmental side to try and create a policy in this country
that cuts off our use of coal, oil and natural gas." Sununu further stated: "I don't think
that's what this country wants ... I don't think America wants not to be able to use their
automobiles." Engelberg, Sununu Says He Revised Speech on Warming, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5,
1990, at A15, col. 1.
10 Shabecoff, European Officials Dispute Bush Over Global Warming, N.Y. Times, April 18,
1990, at B4, col. 5.
11 Document Implies US. Summit Position Will Oppose Greenhouse Gases Timetable, 13 INT'L
ENVT REP. (BNA) No. 6, at 229-30 (June 13, 1990).
12 Shabecoff, European Officials Dispute Bush Over Global Warming, N.Y. Times, April 18,
1990, at B4, col. 5.
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their efforts to reach a new accord in combatting global warming.' 3
The accuracy of that assessment was demonstrated by U.S. attempts
to block reductions in carbon dioxide emissions.' 4
There is a three part explanation for the United States' reluc-
tance to act, indicating that U.S. and international action on global
warming is unlikely. First, global warming and climatic change fall
outside the security sector. Second, when dealing with nonsecurity
issues, scientific uncertainty obstructs policy decisions that entail
high economic or political costs. Third, global warming is enmeshed
in varying degrees of uncertainty. Therefore, to expect national
or international action to arrest global warming is "wildly
unrealistic." ' 5
The premises relied upon for this explanation are deeply flawed,
and the reasoning is circular. First, the assertion that environmental
and energy security fall outside the realm of national and interna-
tional security is demonstrably wrong. Second, the explanation as-
sumes that scientific certainties or verities are immutable realities
that formed the basis of previous environmental decision-making.
The facts of the matter are to the contrary. Third, it presumes that
political action follows scientific certainty. Such a presumption is in-
correct. Finally, it supposes that the cost of cutting down carbon di-
oxide emissions will be prohibitively high. This supposition is also
mistaken.
This Article argues that policy objectives directed toward non-
carbon-emitting fuels, fuel efficiencies, and conservation are solu-
tions not only for the environmental crisis, but for the energy crisis
as well. These alternatives advance both environmental and energy
security. By adopting such policies at a national level, the United
States could mold a new world order.
To understand satisfactorily the solutions advocated in this Arti-
cle, it is necessary to review the phenomena and the effects of global
warming, and to sketch the international character of the responses
13 Split Between U.S. Europe on C0 2 Spilling into IPCC Work, Chairman Says, 13 INr'L ENV'T
REP. (BNA) No. 7, at 283-84 (July 11, 1990).
14 U.S. View Prevails at Climate Parley, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1990, at A9, col. 1 (U.S.
defeated efforts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by setting specific limits).
15 Skolnikoff, The Policy Gridlock on Global Warming, 79 FOREIGN POL'v 77, 78 (1990).
Skolnikoff suggests that "[tihe central problem is that outside the security sector, policy
processes confronting issues with substantial uncertainty do not normally yield policy that
has high economic or political costs". Id. Skolnikoff concluded that
[u]nless overwhelmed by strong and enduring public consensus or by polit-
ical leadership not yet in evidence, the political processes within and among
nations are not likely to bring forth substantial policy action until the uncer-
tainties surrounding climate change are greatly reduced, and probably not
until evidence of warming is palpable. This conclusion holds, even though
the Earth's climate may sustain irreversible changes if some of the forecasts
are correct.
Id. at 88.
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demanded by this challenge. The Article will discuss the expanding
security umbrella, the nature of decision-making under uncertainty,
and will also evaluate the true costs of emission controls. This Arti-
cle concludes that the United States should take decisive affirmative
action to restrict emissions of carbon dioxide.
lI. The Phenomenon
The earth's temperature rests on a delicate heat balance.' 6 So-
lar radiation passes to the earth through the mass of gases found in
the atmosphere, and is reflected back through the same gases. A
complex system of ocean and air currents, evaporation and precipita-
tion, surface and cloud reflection, and absorption form the involved
feedback system that keeps the global energy balance nearly con-
stant. While our climate is the result of a gigantic and complicated
system that humans cannot control or direct, the fragility of the heat
balance makes it possible for human activities affecting "green-
house" gases to damage critical leverage points in the climatic
system.
Greenhouse gases are trace gases, 17 such as carbon dioxide
(CO 2), methane (CM 4), nitrous oxides (NO 4), chlorofluorocarbons
(CFC), and tropospheric ozone (Os), that allow solar radiation into
the earth's atmosphere but prevent heat radiated by the earth from
being reflected back. Carbon dioxide is the most abundant of the
trace gases, composing 0.03% of the atmosphere. There is over-
whelming consensus that intervention in the form of increased at-
mospheric concentration of greenhouse gases might affect the
fragility of the heat balance, and lead to global warming.' 8
16 Solar radiation (sunlight) which is absorbed by and warms the earth must be bal-
anced by radiation in the form of heat that is re-emitted to space. Natural conditions in the
earth's atmosphere ensure that the global mean temperature will not fluctuate greatly over
time. A disruption in the radiation balance could, however, cause relatively large fluctua-
tions in the global mean temperature over time. A reduction in the available energy from
the sun by 2% can, "in theory, lower the [global] mean temperature by 2°C and produce
an ice age." Report of the Study of Critical Environmental Problems (SCEP), MAN'S IMPACT ON
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 10 (1970).
17 The atmosphere is made up of 78.08% nitrogen, 20.95% oxygen, and 0.93% ar-
gon. The remaining 0.04% of the atmosphere consists of a mixture of less abundant gases
which include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides, chloroflourocarbons, and ozone.
These less abundant gases are commonly referred to as "trace gases". W.T. SPROULL, AIR
POLLUTION AND ITS CONTROL 15 (1970).
Moreover, because of the great attention that carbon dioxide has received as a green-
house gas, the remaining "trace gases" are also referred to as "other greenhouse gases" in
literature that is primarily focussed on carbon dioxide. See, e.g., Bolle, Seiler & Bolin, Other
Greenhouse Gases and Aerosols, in THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND Ecosys-
TEMS 157 (B. Bolin, D. Doos, J. Jager, R. Warrick eds. 1986).
18 W.T. SPROULL, supra note 17, at 15. The importance of preserving global ecologi-
cal and climatic balances was recognized in July of 1989 at the meeting of the Group of
Seven major industrialized democracies in Paris, France. Key Sections of the Paris Communique
by the Group of Seven, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1989, at A7, col. I ("There is a growing aware-
ness throughout the world of the necessity to better preserve the global ecological bal-
1991]
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Two international groups of scientists under the auspices of the
United Nations 19 have been studying the problem of global warming
and have come to identical conclusions. They conclude that the
planet faces a real danger of irreversible harm from increased carbon
dioxide emissions. These conclusions are supported by a formidable
body of scientific studies implicating greenhouse gases in global
warming.20
The effects of global temperature increases vary with the extent
and rapidity of the increases. Historically, climatic changes have
been staggered over many centuries, enabling plants and animals to
adapt. For example, although temperatures warmed about five de-
grees centigrade over thousands of years during the Ice Age 18,000
years ago, this increase was slow enough to allow for adaptation.2'
To study the current effects of global warming, experts have devel-
oped "scenarios" to illustrate the possible effects of certain mean
global increases in temperature. In some areas of the world, an in-
crease of one degree centigrade 22 would have helpful effects. For
example, a modest Warming in the far northern latitudes could carry
some advantages for countries such as Canada, China, and the Soviet
Union: resources in their arctic regions would become more accessi-
ble and more easily exploitable. On the other hand, an increase of
one degree centigrade could be accompanied by nontrivial conse-
quences in other regions, especially with regard to climate-sensitive,
ance. This includes serious threats to the atmosphere, which could lead to future climatic
changes.").
19 The first is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) formed in
1988 to advise governments attending the world climate conference. The second, which
was formed in 1986, has no government affiliation but is an association of independent
scientists called the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases. According to the New York
Times the latter body was the progenitor of IPCC. See Stevens, Earlier Harm Seen in Global
Warming, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1990, at A9, col. 1.
20 A review of the scientific evidence is found in THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, CLIMATE
CHANGE, AND ECOSYSTEMS (B. Bolin, D. Doos, J. Jager, R. Warrick eds. 1986) [hereinafter
THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT]; M. BARTH &J. TITUS, GREENHOUSE EFFECT AND SEA LEVEL RISE
(1984); E. EL-HINNAWI & M. HASHMI, THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT, A UNEP REPORT
(1987); ROYAL COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION, TENTH REPORT: TACKLING
POLLUTION-EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS (1984) [hereinafter ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT];
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC UNIONS (ICSU), UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME (UNEP), WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION (WMO), WORLD CLIMATE
PROGRAMME: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE
OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND OF OTHER GREENHOUSE GASES IN CLIMATE VARIATIONS AND Asso-
CIATED IMPACTS (1986) [hereinafter WORLD CLIMATE PROGRAMME].
21 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES (DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS), EXECUTIVE SUM-
MARY 8 (1988) [hereinafter U.S. CLIMATIC CHANGE].
22 When experts discuss the global effects of a warming of the atmosphere in terms of
a I°C rise or a 2-4.5°C rise in temperature it is important to keep in mind that these are
mean global increases; "[t]emperature increases significantly higher than [the projected
mean increase], with attendant changes in precipitation patterns, will occur in latitudes
north and south of the equator." Cooper, The CO2 Challenge, in SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
207 (1987).
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localized sectors of national economies.23 For example, a one de-
gree centigrade temperature increase could shift the corn belt area
of the United States over 100 kilometers northward.2 4 Increases of
between two to four degrees centigrade could present much greater
problems.
Modeling studies have suggested that increased carbon dioxide
concentrations could slow the atmospheric heat engine that is driven
by the differences between equatorial and polar climates.2 5 This
could change the hydrological cycle and affect rainfall patterns.
Tropics and eastern coasts of continents could become wetter, while
subtropics would become drier and increase in area toward higher
latitudes.2 6 Although higher carbon dioxide concentrations per se
may increase plant growth 7 and wateruse efficiency, 28 increased
temperatures are detrimental to agriculture on the whole. 29 Crop
impact analyses show that warmer average temperatures of one to
four degrees centigrade are detrimental to both wheat and maize
yields in the Great Plains and in Western Europe. Average yields
may be reduced by three to seventeen percent.30
Warmer average temperatures could also lead to sea level rises
of between 20 and 140 centimeters.31. A rise of near 140 centimeters
23 Some regional areas of the world would be particularly sensitive to increases in
temperature. For example, an area that is economically based on agricultural crops that
are sensitive to small climatic changes would suffer more than areas that may not be hurt
or even benefited by small rises in temperature. See id. at 207-08.
24 Id. at 207. This illustrates the possibility that seemingly insignificant average tem-
perature changes could have very real consequences in terms of an increase in the fre-
quency of such low-probability events such as droughts, crop failures, and floods.
25 See Manabe, The Effect of Increasing the C02 Concentration on the Climate of a General
Circulation Model, in DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, CARBON DIOXIDE EFFECTS RESEARCH AND As-
SESSMENT PROGRAM: WORKSHOP ON THE GLOBAL EFFECTS OF CARBON DIOXIDE FROM FOSSIL
FUELS 100-01 (W. Elliot & L. Machta eds. 1979); see also Dickinson, How Will Climate
Change?, in THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 20, at 249-52; ROYAL COMMISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 20, at 159.
26 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 159.
27 Under laboratory conditions, increased atmospheric CO 2 conditions increase the
rate of photosynthesis and nitrogen fixation in some plants. Warrick, Gifford, & Parry,
COz Climatic Change and Agriculture, in THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 20, at 406.
28 Stomata (microscopic pores on the leaf surface) allow the inward diffusion of car-
bon dioxide used in photosynthesis and, at the same time, allow the loss of transpired
water. An increase in the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration could reduce the
opening of the stomata required to allow a given amount of carbon dioxide to enter the
plant and might thus reduce the loss of water from a plant. Id. at 402-05.
29 Higher temperatures shorten the crop's life cycle. Although crop yields may in-
crease in some areas, in other areas where heat stress is already a problem and rainfall is
low crop yields will decline. "In most regions of the country, climate change alone could
reduce site to site dryland yields of corn, wheat, and soybeans, with losses ranging from
negligible amounts to 80%." U.S. CLIMATIC CHANGE. supra note 21, at 21-22. See also E.
EL-HINNAWI & M. HASHMI, supra note 20, at 23; Warrick, Gifford & Parry, COL Climatic
Change and Agriculture, in THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 20, at 425.
SO WORLD CLIMATE PROGRAMME, supra note 20, at 22. See Warrick, Gifford & Parry,
COz Climatic Change and Agriculture, in THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note 20, at 425; E.
EL-HINNAWI & M. HASHMI, supra note 20, at 23.
31 E. EL-HINNAWI & M. HASHMI, supra note 20, at 22. Other predictions range from a
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would submerge whole cities, agricultural land, and fragile ecologi-
cal coastlands, as well as swamp dump sites and salinate freshwater
aquifers. 32 Such a scenario will lead to socio-economic and environ-
mental problems of striking magnitude. 33
III. An International Problem
Enormous supplies of inexpensive energy allow us the wide-
spread prosperity we enjoy. Material abundance and "quality of
life," historically restricted to numerically microscopic affluent elites,
have rightfully become the claim of ordinary people the world over.
Fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and gas make such high standards of
living possible. They provide the primary source of energy and
power for transportation, heating, cooling, lighting, and industrial,
commercial, domestic, and leisure activities.34 However, fossil fuels
which have generated the affluence we enjoy are also responsible for
much of our environmental degradation.3 5 Fossil fuels have caused
diverse forms of air pollution, acid rain, and urban smog. Moreover,
they are also suspected to cause global warming and climatic change.
Because cheap energy is the foundation of our present material
prosperity, the implications of cutting carbon dioxide emissions by
20% are simply enormous. These implications touch the deepest
roots of our economy and will affect the prosperity and quality of life
not only of this country, but of the entire community of nations. A
decision to cut substantially carbon dioxide emissions can only make
sense within the framework of an international agreement. The mak-
sea level rise of 56 cm by the year 2100 to a sea level rise of 345 cm by the year 2100.
Titus & Barth, An Overview of the Causes and Effects of Sea Level Rise, in M. BARTH &J. TiTus,
supra note 20, at 16.; Robin, Changing the Sea Level, in THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT, supra note
20, at 355.
32 See Titus & Barth, An Overview of the Causes and Effects of Sea Level Rise, in M. BARTH &
J. TITus, supra note 20, at 19-21.
33 Even more dramatic changes have been forecast. It has been suggested that global
warming could lead to the melting of the marine West Antarctic ice sheet raising the
global sea level by several meters. Mercer, West Antarctic Ice Sheet and C0 2 Greenhouse Effect: A
Threat of Disaster, 271 NATURE 321 (1978). Such predictions are based on evidence "that
the West Antarctic Ice Sheet completely disappeared during previous global warmings,
raising sea levels by 5-6 meters 120,000 years ago." Hoffman, Estimates of Future Sea Level
Rise, in M. BARTH & J. TrrUs, supra note 20, at 94. Nevertheless, most glaciologists now
believe that any problem of this scale is "long term and unlikely to occur in the next cen-
tury or two." ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 159.
34 Coal, oil, and natural gas are used to generate 72% of the electricity in the U.S.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE: STRATEGIES FOR ENERGY
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 47 (1990) [hereinafter CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE].
Transportation needs are met almost exclusively on petroleum products. Id. at 67.
35 Id. at 45. Transportation and electric power generation contribute equally to total
approximately 90% of the carbon dioxide emissions in this country. Together they emit
over 900 million metric tons of carbon into the atmosphere. Id. at 47, 68. Petroleum
products account for 7% of the electric power emissions and virtually all of the transporta-
tion sector emissions. Id. at 47. Coal, a particularly heavy polluter, generates 85% of
electric power generating emissions. Id.
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ing of such an agreement falls within the province of international
law. There is no doubt that global warming cannot be arrested by
the actions of individual states acting unilaterally.5 6 Even the biggest
producer of carbon dioxide emissions, the United States, accounts
for only 25% of total emissions.3 7 Even if the United States reduced
its emissions by 20%, the process of global warming would proceed
unabated.38 Furthermore, any such unilateral reductions would put
the United States in a disadvantageous competitive position unless
other nations reduced emissions as well. Nations cannot be ex-
pected to make reductions in carbon dioxide emissions that are both
disproportionately costly and economically disadvantageous.
Only universally accepted global norms and international stan-
dards will suffice. Such standards alone can reduce trace gases that
are causing global warming. Unfortunately, existing international
law possesses neither the substantive law, standards, remedies, nor
institutions to confront the current planetary environmental peril.
What is required, therefore, is a new global treaty creating standards
accepted by all nations.3 9 The community of nations envisages such
36 Richardson, How To Fight Global Warming, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1990, at A25, col. 1.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 To rely on customary international law in a substantial, as distinct from interstitial,
manner displays surprisingly poor judgment. The problems of international law are mag-
nified by customary international law. There is no law-making, law-declaring, or law-en-
forcing body in international law. See generally, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 222-26
(4th ed. 1961). These impediments are compounded by the tortuous processes, first of
state practice and opinio juris involved in the creation of customary international law, and
secondly, in applying it. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-11
(1990).
It is, therefore, hard to comprehend the advice of an editor of the American Journal of
International Law. Relying on a recent resolution of the United Nations General Assem-
bly on the "Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind,"
he suggests that nation states should uphold international law by relying on obligations
erga omnes to protect the atmosphere. Kirgis, Editorial Comment, Standing to Challenge
Human Endeavors That Could Change Climate, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1990). To begin with,
he does not answer the fundamental question of how a resolution of the non-legislative
General Assembly can create such an obligation when the resolution itself does not pur-
port to do so. The resolution in question rejected the concept of the common heritage
essential to the creation of rights erga omnes. Moreover, there are a cluster of other diffi-
culties surrounding such an approach. The Chernobyl disaster vividly demonstrated that
nation states display little interest in pursuing remedies in international law even where
they are demonstrably and deeply affected. After Chernobyl, Poland, Rumania, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, Austria, and Italy suffered tangible damage from fallout. Note, The
International Fallout From Chernobyl, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L. 319 (1987). Note, After Chernobyl:
Liabilityfor NuclearAccidents Under International Law, 25 COLUM.J. INT'L L. 647 (1987). It can
be argued, furthermore, that customary international law places an obligation on the So-
viet Union to prevent the kind of nuclear damage it caused. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 437- 40 (1990)(based upon principles of objective responsibil-
ity); J.SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS AN INTERNA-
TIONAL ECOLOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 48-50 (1979)(based on case law on state
environmental responsibility). See also principles 21 and 22 of the Stockholm Declaration
on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14 (1972). Secondly, a recent case
from Nicaragua reaffirmed that international litigation, based on customary law, has hardly
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 16
a treaty, which is scheduled to be negotiated at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development in 1992.40
International law can only be created by international consen-
sus. A world convention placing restrictions on carbon dioxide
emissions will be hopelessly ineffective without the agreement of the
powerful world economies. In light of the United States, the Soviet
Union, and Saudi Arabia's opposition to emission limitations, the
prospects of a successfully negotiated treaty-which would require
stabilization of emissions, or even more pointedly, that stipulates nu-
merical emissions limitations and would provide a fixed timetable for
the implementation of reductions in emissions-are not particularly
high.4'
A. Global Security
As already stated, global warming presents a threat to environ-
mental security that must be addressed. But outside the security sec-
tor, the belief is that scientific uncertainties encountered in dealing
with global warming render the prospect of international or U.S. ac-
tion against global warming wildly unrealistic. 42
This conclusion is based on assumptions which are untenable.
First, global warming constitutes a threat to the security of the world.
In the past global insecurity encompassed military threats, armed ag-
gression, and the Cold War.43 The concept of security was ex-
panded in the 1970's to include international economics, as it
became clear that the U.S. economy was no longer an independent
been determinative of fundamental political problems. Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), 1986 I.CJ.
14 (Judgment ofJune 27). Finally, even if an obligation erga omnes exists, such obliga-
tions, especially in an amorphous and "soft" area of law such as international law, are
notoriously obscure, indefinite, and surrounded by controversy. See generally, Gaja, Obliga-
tions Erga Omnes, International Crimes and Jus Cogens: A Tentative Analysis of Three Related Con-
cepts, in J.H. WEILER, A. CASSESE & M. SPINEDI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE 151
(1989).
40 U.N. Doc. A/Res.44/228 (1990).
41 Talks on Climate End With Accord, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1991, at A7, col. 1. Although
the United States apparently agreed to negotiate about emission limits, it has consistently
refused to commit to fixed targets or a timetable for emission limitations. That resistance
to targets and timetables remains firm. There is no indication, moreover, that the
problems of technology transfer or assistance to third world countries has been resolved.
42 Skolnikoff, supra note 15, at 78.
43 We witness the staggering collapse and death throes of the Soviet empire that is
perceived as the primary cause of insecurity. Security has usually been viewed as the free-
dom from danger posed by military threats and armed aggression. National security has,
therefore, been thought of as the capacity of the U.S. to thwart armed aggression by the
Soviet Union. Unfortunately, even the removal of the Soviet threat, and the dismantling of
the nuclear arsenals, the cause of military insecurity, will not usher in an era of security.
See Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 23, 28-30 (1990); ARMS CONTROL
ASSOCIATION, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY 5-15 (1989). The Gulf War demon-
strated the extent to which small nations can pose a major threat to military security.
Krauthammer, supra, at 28-33.
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force, but was powerfully affected by economic policies in other
countries. 44 It is alleged that threats to economic security have
grown in importance. It is claimed that national security in the
1990's faces a challenge not confronted during the Cold War pe-
riod-where, though not clear and present dangers, economic issues
present dim, perhaps distant threats. Notwithstanding the absence
of proximity or intensity, economic issues are perceived as dangers
to security.45 Furthermore, as already noted, the National Energy
Strategy of the United States brings energy security within the secur-
ity umbrella. 46
The threat to security, as Lester Brown pointed out with percipi-
ence and insight, "may now arise less from the relationship of nation
to nation and more from the relationship of man to nature. ' '47 For
the first time in history, human action is dramatically altering the
physiology and metabolism of the entire planet. The crisis con-
fronting humankind today is massive and widespread global assaults
on our planetary system rather than containable pockets of high pol-
lution. In light of this peril, redefining national security to include
environmental dangers is demanded. 48
Second, fossil fuels are nonrenewable, and in the case of oil, the
time frame for its exhaustion is very limited. Oil is a self-contained
fuel that is combustible without subsidiary components. When it is
exhausted, there will be no more oil. While it is conceivable that a
technological solution that prolongs the life span of oil could be de-
veloped, there is no guarantee this will happen. The prospect of a
world without oil is horrendous. While other sources of energy
could provide alternative fuels, the question is whether or not we are
attempting to find such fuels or, as seems the case, whether we are
intent on using up our oil reserves without concern for the future
energy or environmental security of the world.
These environmental problems are not issues of concern only to
44 Mathews, Redefining Security, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 162, 162 (1989).
45 Moran, International Economics and Security, 69 FOREIGN AFF. 74, 74 (1990). From
the standpoint of the United States the most pressing problems of national security
include:
encouraging stability and reform in the Soviet Union, maintaining a coopera-
tive U.S.-Japanese relationship .... avoiding vulnerabilities from the global-
ization of America's defense industrial base[,] . . . reducing dependence on
oil from the Persian Gulf, moderating the impact on the Third World of the
prolonged debt crisis and limiting the damage from the narcotics trade.
Id.
46 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. According to Brooks Yeager, a lobbyist
for the National Audubon Society, oil policy and the Persian Gulf conflict have been "ee-
rily disengaged from each other." Why America Still Hates the Word 'Energy Policy', N.Y.
Times, Feb. 17, 1991, at 4, col. 1.
47 L.R. BROWN, HUMAN NEEDS AND THE SECURrry OF NAIONS 6 (1978). An elegant
and compelling current restatement of the threats is found in Mathews, supra note 44, at
162.
48 Mathews, supra note 44, at 162.
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environmentalists. The global economy, health, and modem civiliza-
tion as we know it depend on these planetary systems.49 Anything
that seriously threatens them also threatens the human prospect.
The security problem presented by global warming cannot be solved
between two superpowers, or even by the efforts of the major indus-
trialized countries. Safeguarding the world requires a truly global
effort. International law must become the principal instrument to
this effect.
B. Uncertainty
The second assumption made by those who argue that no action
should be taken on global warming is that scientific uncertainty pre-
cludes national and international lawmaking. Although we do pos-
sess strong evidence of the global warming phenomenon, it is by no
means conclusive. There is still some uncertainty about (a) the exist-
ence, (b) the extent, and (c) the consequences or effects of global
warming. These uncertainties are compounded by differences in the
nature of action required to combat climatic change.
The false premise, that scientific certainty is a precondition for
national and international environmental lawmaking, implies that
lawmaking should be limited to areas where scientific certainty ex-
ists-exactly the position of the United States-thus positing what
49 Although it is the most ominous among the global perils, global warming shares
many attributes with other second generation environmental problems. See Wetstone, A
Histoty of the Acid Rain Issue, in SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 163, 191 (1987). Examples of
other second generation problems include: ozone depletion; the destruction of genetic
diversity; and the cycling of toxic chemicals through the environment. The massive in-
crease of chlorofluorocarbons has resulted in the depletion of the ozone layer.
The genetic diversity of the species inhabiting the planet has been endangered by
massive deforestation and destruction of natural habitat. Tropical forests harbor a dispro-
portionate share of the earth's biological diversity. Each year an area the size of Austria is
being deforested from these tropical forests. Biologists estimate that species are being lost
at a rate 1,000-10,000 times faster than the natural rate of evolution. BIODIVERSITY 3-18
(E.O. Wilson ed. 1988). As many as 20% of all the species now living may disappear by
the year 2000. Mathews, supra note 44, at 165. Mathews argues that the loss will be felt
aesthetically, scientifically, and above all economically. Id. These genetic resources are an
important source of food, materials for energy and construction, chemicals for
pharmaceuticals and industry, vehicles for health and safety testing, natural pest controls,
and dozens of other uses. "The bitter irony is that genetic diversity is disappearing on a
grand scale at the very moment when biotechnology makes it possible to exploit fully this
resource for the first time." Id. See also Wolf, 4voiding a Mass Extinction of Species, in STATE
OF THE WORLD 101 (1988).
The cycling of toxic chemicals through the environment has proved pandemic and
assumes the character of a global threat. There are over 5 million known chemicals of
which about 60,000 to 70,000 are in use. Both conventional and toxic pollutants are cy-
cled through the oceans, the atmosphere, the biosphere, and the geosphere. Toxic chemi-
cals moving through the environment pose a global threat because of their toxicity,
persistence, and bioaccumulation. They cause death or serious illness in very low concen-
trations-in the low parts per billion or parts per trillion. As they journey through the
oceans, the atmosphere, and the biosphere they leave a trail of sometimes deadly harm
that can only satisfactorily be dealt with through international mechanisms. The interna-
tional magnitude of the problem has resulted in a number of international conventions.
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ought to be as if50 it were an empirical or "descriptive" thesis.5 l
Such a supposition is based on a fundamental misconception of
the interaction between science and policymaking. It assumes that
scientifically certain answers or verities are to be found. Such is
clearly not the case. As Weinberg so powerfully demonstrated, many
of the questions asked of scientists by policymakers cannot be an-
swered by science. Though they are epistemologically questions of
fact and can be stated in the language of science, they are unanswer-
able by science. They transcend science and involve "trans-scien-
tific" answers which are inextricably tied to policy and politics. 5 2 For
example, the question of whether a substance causes cancer or other
adverse health effects assumes an affirmative or negative answer. Yet
there are few chemicals on which human data is unequivocal. Con-
clusive direct evidence of a threat to human health is rare. Fewer
than thirty chemicals have been definitely linked with cancer in
humans. In contrast, some 1,500 are reportedly carcinogenic in
animals. 53
Ethical considerations prevent deliberate human experiments
with potentially dangerous chemicals, while the length of the latency
period for cancer and other effects complicate epidemiologic studies.
Thus, animal models are used to investigate whether exposure to
chemicals is related to human health effects. Here, Weinberg's origi-
nal examples of trans-scientific questions are still compelling: "to de-
termine at the 95 percent confidence level by direct experiment
whether 150 millirems will increase the mutation rate by 1/2 percent
requires about 8,000,000,000 mice!" 54
Weinberg's example related to the effect of radiation on mice.
Certainty becomes even more elusive when assessing the effects of
chemicals on humans. A positive answer to the question whether a
particular chemical causes cancer in animals is treated as evidence
that it may pose a threat to humans.5 5 Scientists consider the effects
on laboratory animals and extrapolate the results to humans. 56 The
inference that results from animals are applicable to humans is fun-
damental to toxicologic research,57 despite known metabolic differ-
ences between animals and humans, 58 and the absence of evidence
50 See H. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF "As IF" (1925).
51 The distinction between a "descriptive" and "prescriptive" analysis is elegantly
and authoritatively delineated by H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 182-83 (4th ed.
1961). The need to analytically distinguish what "is" from what "ought" to be serves
clarity. W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 210 (4th ed. 1960).
52 Weinberg, Science and its Limits: The Regulator's Dilema, in HAZARDS: TECHNOLOGY
AND FAIRNESS 9 (1986).
53 Id. at 11.
54 Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209, 210 (1972).
55 Weinberg, supra note 52, at 19.
56 Id. at 12.
57 Id. at 22.
58 For example, when determining the response of different species to chemicals,
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establishing human carcinogenicity as a scientific fact. Not surpris-
ingly, legislative and administrative action on environmental ques-
tions have been taken, internationally and in the United States,
despite almost endemic uncertainty.5 9
The view that environmental law and policy is based on objec-
tive science has been trenchantly criticized, 60 and has now been sub-
many chemicals appear to be carcinogenic in one species or strain and not in another -
even when only rodents are being compared. Notice, Chemical Carcinogens, Review of
the Science and its Associated Principles, 49 Fed. Reg. 21594, 21597 (1984).
59 The uncertainties surrounding risk evaluation have been illuminatingly delineated
by Rodgers. They relate to: data uncertainty, indeterminacy, historical uncertainty, and
transcientific or global policy choice. Rodgers, Guerilla Decisionmaking: Judicial Review of Risk
Assessments, 15J. HAZARDOUS MAT. 205 (1987).
Data shortages include uncertainty about groups exposed, routes of exposure, pat-
terns and practices of uses, and behavior of chemicals within the environment. For exam-
ple the Office of Science and Technology Policy described "[tihe most comprehensive
reference on the subject" as a well referenced "semi-technical" review of the physical,
chemical and biological data on which decisions are made. Office of Science and Technol-
ogy Policy, Chemical Carcinogens; Review of the Science and Its Associated Principles, 49 Fed. Reg.
21,594 (1984) (citing 15TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMETAL QUALITY).
An exposure assessment involves an estimate of the amount of a given chemical sub-
stance that is absorbed by an individual over time. This is a highly complex technical
specialty. Id. at 21,649. The process involves consideration of the magnitude, frequency,
and duration of encounters between individuals and the chemical in question. This exer-
cise is often associated "with a dearth of data." Id. While some data may be available on
the direct exposure by breathing the emissions from a manufacturing plant, estimates of
the indirect exposure resulting from potential bioaccumulation in the food chain may be
less precisely known.
Indeterminacy embraces the shape of the dose-response curves, the relevance of
animal studies, the relationship of exposures to effects observed in epidemiological stud-
ies, and even whether there are safe threshold levels of exposures to given substances.
Indeterminacy abounds when extrapolating from high dosage representative samples to
low dose exposures in large populations. No single mathematical procedure is recognized
as the most appropriate for low dose extrapolation in carcinogenesis. Id. at 21,649,
21,652. For a given exposure source, the concentration or amount of the chemical in that
medium is determined by measurement, estimated by modeling, calculated from physical-
chemical properties and other information on the agent, or projected form data on surro-
gate chemicals. Indeterminacy continues into hazard or dose response assessment. This
is a quantitative exercise that attempts to describe the expected human response to any
given level of carcinogenic exposure. Id. at 21,657.
By historical uncertainties, Rodgers refers to uncertainties arising out of attempts to
understand events that are non-recurring and non-replicable. Saccharine was banned be-
cause it was found to be carcinogenic, but even this easy example, Rodgers argues, offers a
virtual blank in assessing the costs and benefits of a product used for years by over 50
million people.
Whether a chemical should be banned despite its benefits is a trans-scientific question.
It usually involves a total evaluation of the qualitative evidence, the exposure information,
and the quantitative results. The final product of this evaluation is, typically, the genera-
tion of a quantitative estimate of the human cancer risk associated with the projected expo-
sure profile. Such a qualitative estimate is arrived at by resolving scientific uncertainty on
the basis ofjudgement. In the result, we receive further confirmation that risk assessment
is an amalgam of scientific data, assumptions, and judgments based upon prevailing scien-
tific thought and policy decisions. Id. at 21,660-61.
60 An eminent scientist observes that decisive data concerning the harmful health ef-
fects of chemicals at low doses are unavailable and will never be determined. He argues
that, as a result, extrapolations rest on "an uncertain scientific foundation." Hornig, Science
and Government in the USA, in SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 22-23 (1987). In fact, EPA ad-
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stantially qualified by a recent report of the National Research
Council.61 The report draws attention to the uncertainties involved
in the scientific process and the fallibility of scientists' judgments. 62
But those opposing action against global warming seek to distin-
guish the control of toxic chemicals from attempts to control global
warming. It is argued that the kind of socio-economic disruption
caused by attempts to remedy global warming is so enormous that it
might be better to defer action until stronger evidence is forthcom-
ing. They conclude that the cost of overreaction is much too oner-
ous, and that no precipitate and costly action should be taken.63
Decisions might rationally be deferred until conclusive scientific
proof is available, were it certain that we would not be overtaken by
the feared peril. However, global warming offers no such certainty.
When confronting irreversible effects, the cost of postponement is
too high. Lawmakers have rightly assumed that decisions should be
made despite uncertainty. Postponing action on the basis of a false
negative-a wrong finding that something does not pose a risk-
could be disastrous.64 The only way to obtain direct and conclusive
evidence is to incur the risk involved. Such a course of action is fool-
hardy where the disaster is irreversible. Scientific evidence points to
the likelihood, though not the certainty, of a global threat. Such a
mits that risk assessments, although conducted by scientists, are not "science" and that no
one should be misled into believing that results using present techniques have the status
of scientific findings. 15TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
rrY/1984 SPECIAL REPORT: RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT 217 (1984). Even the
National Research Council explicitly and unequivocally admitted to "great" and "perva-
sive" uncertainty. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT:
MANAGING THE PROCESS 11 (1983). Indeed they referred to the many policy decisions that
may need to be taken at the risk assessment stage. hI at 33-37.
61 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPORVING RISK COMMUNICATION (1989).
62 Id. at 37-47.
63 Global Climate Change: Hearings Before House Subcomm. on Oceanography and the Great
Lakes of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 1st Sess 128 (1989)(state-
ment of Dr. Andrew R. Solow).
64 Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q0 207, 230-36.
(1978). It is sometimes assumed that the effects of a chemical should be proved like the
guilt of an accused in a criminal trial. Id. at 233. In criminal law two basic kinds of mis-
takes can occur. A guilty man can be found innocent or an innocent man can be found
guilty. According to Page, the former type of error is called a false negative, the latter a
false positive. Id. Limiting false positives is the guiding principle of criminal law. This is
because of the exceptional social value placed on liberty, and the abhorrence attaching to
the wrongful deprivation of liberty. Id. at 233-34.
The evidence required before acting to prevent environmental risk, however, cannot
be compared to the burden of proof required in a criminal trial. Id. at 234. The impor-
tance of liberty requires that a false positive be avoided. Accordingly a heavy burden of
proof beyond reasonable doubt is required. When confronting risk it is more important to
prevent a false negative that a false positive. Id. at 236-39. This is because the conse-
quences of a false negative that seriously affects public health and the environment are so
important that society attaches exceptional value to its protection. Societal desire to avoid
mistakes affecting health and the environment results in its limiting false negatives more
than false positives. Accordingly the evidence required is less onerous than might be the
case in situations where it is more socially important to avoid false positives. Id. at 239.
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likelihood of harm warrants the adoption of remedial measure, de-
spite scientific uncertainties. This conclusion was recently endorsed
by scientists at the Second World Climate Conference. 65
C. The Costs of Emission Reductions
A comprehensive Environmental Protection Agency study "con-
cluded that very large reductions (on the order of 50-80% of current
levels) in worldwide CO 2 emissions are required, starting now, to
achieve stabilization of atmospheric [greenhouse gases] at their cur-
rent levels." 6 6 Some deem the price of an insurance policy against
global warming to be too high. They view emission limitations as an
"unifocal" remedy that seeks only to negate the consequences of
global warming. 67 It has been estimated that the cost of stabilizing
carbon dioxide emissions for the United States would be $50 billion
annually. For the world economy, the cost would be around $5.2
trillion.68 This very high cost reflects the economic regression that
may result from abandoning coal and oil, in the absence of other
tried and tested sources of cheap reliable fuel that can take their
place.
The cost of oil, however, may have taken a dramatic leap, in light
of the Gulf War. A major part of the military expenses and loss of
life suffered in the Gulf should be added to the cost of oil. Further-
more, it is becoming clearer that a continued and reliable flow of oil
can only be assured by a permanent U.S or allied presence in the
Gulf,69 costing billions of additional dollars per year. This is the true
cost of oil.
If, however, the United States were to change to a different en-
ergy policy, (one that relied, for example, on energy efficiency and
hydrogen based fuels, instead of carbon-based fossil fuels) 70 we
would provide answers not only to the Middle East crisis, but also to
global warming. 7' Therefore, the move to noncarbon-emitting alter-
65 Response Strategies Should Be Developed in Spite of Uncertainties, Scientists Say, 13 Ir'L
ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 13, at 455 (Nov. 7, 1990).
66 CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 34, at 21 (citing Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, Office of Planning and Evaluation, Presentation to the Committee on Alter-
native Energy Research and Development Strategies, National Research Council
Washington, D.C., June 12, 1989).
67 Id.
68 Report Calls for Coordinated Research on Economic Effects of Climate Change, 13 INT'L
ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 13, at 458 (Nov. 7, 1990) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF LONG TERM GLOBAL CHANGE (1990)).
69 Aho & Stokes, supra note 5, at 162.
70 Kieschnick & Helm, Energy Planning in a Dynamic World: Overview and Perspective, in
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND CONSEQUENCES 15
(J.L. Helm ed. 1990).
71 Energy experts at the University of Texas view the current instability in the world
oil market as a mandate to start making investments in alternative energy sources. While
admitting that the lead time to implement new sources will be long and painful, these
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natives to oil could be justified on energy, as well as "environmental,
grounds.
Energy security arising from the ability of the United States to
extricate itself from the morass of the Middle East 72 must be in-
cluded in the cost of reducing emissions of carbon dioxide. Such a
move cannot be attributed to the fear of global warming alone. Tak-
ing the vanguard against climatic change will both motivate and en-
able the United States to adopt domestic policies allowing it to break
loose from carbon-based fossil fuel dependence. New sources of
noncarbon-based fuels will strengthen, not weaken, the international
competitive position of the United States. Some energy sources of-
fering significant exploitation potential include biomass, 73 geother-
mal, 74 Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion, wind, 75 solar power,76
and photovoltaics. 7 7
Similarly, energy efficiency, grounded in the conservation ethic,
is also a multifocal remedy that addresses both energy and environ-
mental security. Climate change is only one of several good reasons
to consider a policy of energy efficiency. Energy efficiency can be
applied to electric power generation, 78 transportation, 79 and resi-
dential and commercial buildings.80
experts agree that formulating a proper energy policy will be a meaningful first step. 16
ENERGY STUDIES 1 (September/October 1990).
72 Aho & Stokes, supra note 5, at 162. The costs of not doing so could be devastating.
An increase of $10 in the price of a barrel of oil translates into a $80 billion cost increase
to the nation's economy. This increase drives interest rates up, exports down, and causes
prices to generally increase 2%. Id.
73 Burning biomass is a renewable resource that makes no net contribution to atmos-
pheric carbon dioxide. CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 34, at 53. At present,
the biomass generating capacity in the United States is about 8 GW (gigawatts) and is
concentrated in the pulp and paper industry, where the fuel used is low cost wood wastes.
Id. Promising new technologies have the potential to make biomass competitive with coal
generated electricity. See Expanding Roles for Gas Turbines in Power Generation, in ELECTRICITY:
EFFICIENT END-USE AND NEW GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES, AND THEIR PLANNING IMPLICA-
TIONS (R.H. Williams, et. al. eds. 1989).
74 Although only 3 GW of electricity is currently being produced by geothermal
sources, the U.S Geological Survey estimates potential "total U.S. geothermal resources
usable for power generation to be 2,400 quads, located primarily in the western states,
Alaska and Hawaii." CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 34, at 54.
75 Coupled with its high acessibility, wind power may become a cost effective energy
source in the future. Id. at 54. California has 1.5 GW of installed wind capacity and the
best of these farms have reduced costs fourfold since 1981. Id. Because wind is less de-
pendent on latitude than other solar sources, it is highly accessible. It is estimated that
wind can produce 1,000 times the power it currently generates. Id.
76 The National Research Council also sees solar-thermal electric power as promis-
ing. Id. at 54. Currently, 280 MW are supplied by solar power and a further 320 MW are
planned, as new technologies unfold. Id.
77 Photovoltaic modules may also become a more attractive source, given that new
technologies are reducing costs and enabling systems to be used at small scale. Id. The
price of photovoltaic modules has fallen from its 1970s price of about $120 per peak watt
to $4 or $5 per peak watt today. Id.
78 NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 30-39.
79 See id. at 60-72.
80 See id. at 40-59.
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Cars and light trucks account for 57% of the carbon dioxide
emissions of the transportation sector. Environmental and energy
security demand improved fuel efficiency, and an increase in the use
of smaller vehicles. Also, reducing the amount of energy consumed
for heating, cooling, ventilating, and lighting buildings in the United
States would reduce greenhouse emissions while contributing to en-
ergy security.
D. The World Climate Convention
The assumption that there is an absence of international com-
mitment to global action directed at averting climatic change is sim-
ply incorrect. Numerous meetings of international scientists, as
already noted,8' demonstrate the extent and nature of international
concern. A multilateral convention treaty that protects global cli-
mate is expected to be signed at the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development in 1992,82 having been preceded by
negotiations at the Second World Climate Conference,83 where rep-
resentatives from 137 countries agreed on the need to stabilize emis-
sions of greenhouse gases.8 4
VI. United States Action
The most productive developments in international environ-
mental law have arisen from domestic pressures within nations, such
that domestic laws and policies have become the building blocks of
international law.8 5 If the United States, as the leading emitter of
81 See supra notes 8 & 19 and accompanying text.
82 Preparations for Global Change Pact Could Begin in Fall Under IPCC Meeting Plan, 13
INr'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 2, at 41-42 (Feb. 14, 1990).
83 Geneva, 29 October to 7 November 1990. See World Meteorological Organization
(WMO), United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), United Nations Educational, Sci-
entific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO),
International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU): Doc /M/SWCC-MF (Oct. 12, 1990).
84 U.S., Western Europe Reach Compromise on Dealing With Greenhouse Effect Gases, 13 INr'L
ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 14, at 479 (Nov. 21, 1990).
85 For example, the environmental consequences of acid rain were made known to
the Swedish public by Swedish scientists in the 1960s. Public pressure prompted the
Swedish government to take action on acid rain within Sweden. Thereafter the govern-
ment submitted a case study on the environmental aspects of sulphur dioxide to the UN
Conference on the Human Environment 1972 (The Stockholm Conference). Wetstone, A
History of the Acid Rain Issue, in SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 165-66 (H. Brooks & G.L.
Cooper, eds. 1987). See also ROYAL MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AIR POLLUTION
ACROSS BOUNDARIES: THE IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT OF SULPHUR IN AIR AND PRECIPITA-
TION, SWEDEN'S CASE STUDY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVI-
RONMENT IN STOCKHOLM (1972).
West Germany, the third largest producer of sulphur dioxide in Western Europe, was
originally unconcerned about international air pollution. This attitude of indifference
soon changed when experts revealed to the Federal Government that fully 560,000 hect-
ares or nearly 8% of Germany's forest area had been damaged by acid rain. G.S. WET-
STONE & A. ROSENCRANZ, ACID RAIN IN RAIN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: NATIONAL
RESPONSES TO AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 79-80 (1983). West Germany soon became the
chief protagonist within the EC for controls on acid rain and in pressing for the enactment
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carbon dioxide in the world, could formulate and adopt effective pol-
icies adaptable to the rest of the international community, it would
simultaneously be filling a lacunae in international law. In short,
U.S. environmental laws addressing global warming could offer ra-
tional and compelling legal responses to a planetary peril, that could
be adopted internationally. Obversely, U.S reluctance to take steps
to reduce the use of carbon dioxide will obstruct international ac-
cord. Even if a global treaty places limits on carbon dioxide emis-
sions, there is no guarantee that the United States will sign it.
Emerging international laws against global warming should,
therefore, reflect the convergence of national and international
thinking. Conversely, the obvious helplessness of national law
(caused by problems that have outstripped and outgrown their ex-
isting jurisdiction and outreach) can only be overcome by a new gen-
eration of national environmental laws that seek to integrate national
and international law and policy. A new synthesis of national and
international law is needed.
Recent attempts at international lawmaking have taught us some
salutary lessons. The world's nations, through fifteen years of pro-
tracted negotiations, developed the United Nations Convention of
the Law of the Sea, a constitution for the oceans. 86 Unfortunately,
this major historic global treaty was rejected by the United States,
West Germany, the United Kingdom, and other European nations
because it did not accord with their national laws and policies. The
saga of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea con-
tains a fundamental lesson for those seeking action on global warm-
ing-international lawmaking cannot be divorced from national
lawmaking. Indeed, changes in national laws and policies may well
of the EC directive controlling air pollution from industrial plants. 27 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 188) 20 (1984).
The U.S. was one of the prime movers in the Montreal Protocol which regulated
CFC's more seriously. Mintz, Keeping Pandora's Box Shut. A Critical Assessment of the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 565, 575
n.58 (1989). The U.S was one of the first nations to have introduced legislation to curb
CFC's. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7450-7459 (1986).
86 The saga of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has
been ably chronicled by John Stevenson and Bernard Oxman. See Stevenson & Oxman,
The Preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1974); Stevenson &
Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69
Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1975); Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 Am.J. INT'L L. 763 (1975); Oxman, The Third United
Nations Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York Session, 72 Am.J. INT'L L. 57 (1978); Oxman, The
Third United Nations Law of the Sea: The Seventh Session (1978), 73 Am.J. INT'L L. 1 (1979);
Oxman, The Third United Nations Law of the Sea: The Eighth Session (1979), 74 Am.J. INT'L L. I
(1980); Oxman, The Third United Nations Law of the Sea: The Ninth Session (1980), 75 Am. J.
INT'LL. 211 (1981); Oxman, The Third United Nations Law of the Sea: The Tenth Session (1981),
76 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1982). A useful narrative tracing the unfolding developments of
UNCLOS is found in the introduction to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea. See Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 21 INT'L L. MAr. 1261, 1271-72
(1982).
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constitute a vital step in the creation of international laws and stan-
dards dealing with global warming.
The United States recently joined seventy-three other nations in
agreeing that human activity is causing the earth's atmosphere to
heat up. The U.S. delegation chief stated that U.S. agreement to the
report amounted to a formal recognition of the reality of global
warming and climatic change. 87 At a subsequent international con-
ference, however, the United States opposed specific targets for
emission reductions.88 Such conduct testifies to reluctant agree-
ment, rather than principled and enthusiastic support, for addressing
global warming. In the United States, those who reluctantly accept
the need for some international action to avoid global warming have
stated that it is not in the country's self-interest for the United States
to take the vanguard in the war against global warming. Doing so
would adversely affect the economic position of the United States.89
We have already dealt with this argument in the context of the al-
leged prohibitive cost of measures to control global warming, find-
ing that a policy conferring energy security on the United States is
not against the country's self-interest.
Climatic change is a serious national problem. Climatic change
could have a traumatic impact on all aspects of North American life,
particularly on agriculture, 90 human habitation, and water supply. 91
87 Global Warming, Caused By Humans U.N. Report Says, 13 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No.
9, at 355 (Sept. 12, 1990).
88 Coal Important Element in Planning National Energy Strategy, 13 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA)
No. 14, at 487 (Nov. 21, 1990).
89 Bush Says World Must Strike Balance Between Economic Growth, Environment, 13 INT'L
ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 2, at 43 (Feb. 14, 1990).
90 Agriculture contributed 17.5% of the GNP of the United States in 1985. The
United States produces nearly 50% of the world's corn and nearly 60% of its soybeans.
Wirth, Climate Chaos, 74 FOREIGN POL'Y 1, 3 (1989). The immense productivity of U.S.
farmland has been a major reason why the U.S. has evolved into a giant economic power.
Id. at 11. The United States pre-eminence in world affairs is largely due to its economic
strength. For this reason, the U.S. has a large investment in the status quo, and has a
considerable stake in the global climate battle. Id. Crop production is sensitive to temper-
ature, precipitation, soils, and irrigation. "During the dust bowl years of the 1930s wheat
and corn yields dropped by up to 50%, and during the drought of 1988, estimates of corn
yield showed a decline of 37%." U.S. CLIMATIC CHANGE, supra note 21, at 21.
91 The most comprehensive study on the environmental effects of climate change in
the United States has been undertaken by the EPA. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 21,
at 14. The study concludes that a rise in sea levels is one of the most certain impacts of
climate change. Id. Some scientists fear that an estimated rise of between 50 and 200 cm.
The study estimated the potential nationwide loss of wetlands, and the cost of defending
currently developed areas from the rising sea for three scenarios (50, 100 and 200 cm) of
sea level rise will drown coastal wetlands. Id. at 16. Historically, wetlands have kept pace
with a slow rate of sea level rise. The report argues that in the future, sea levels will
probably rise too fast for marshes and swamps to keep pace. If there were to be a one
meter rise in the sea level, 26-66% of coastal wetland would be lost if wetland migration is
not blocked by bulkheads and levees. If all shorelines were protected, total wetland losses
would increase to 50-82% because bulkheads and levees would prevent the formation of
inland wetlands. Id. at 15. Coastal lowlands would be inundated. If so there would be a
need to hold back the sea. Given high property values of developed coastlines, for a one
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In response, a number of bills before Congress have undertaken the
urgent and compelling task of providing answers to global warm-
ing.92 The underlying conclusions and articulated purposes of the
Global Climate Protection Act of 1987 (GCPA),93 and the bills being
examined by Congress 94 emphasize that affirmative action should be
taken in the United States and internationally to address the causes
of global warming. The GCPA, for example, after recounting that
carbon dioxide and other trace gases "may be producing a long term
and substantial increase in the average temperature of the earth," 95
meter rise the capital cost of protecting currently developed areas until the year 2100 is
estimated at $73-111 billion (in 1988 dollars). Id at 15. Sea level rises will increase
coastal flooding, erode beaches and increase salinity in estuaries and coastal aquifers. For
example, there may be an enlarged and more saline Sacramento-San Joachin Delta, while
New York, Miami and other coastal communities would have to increase the current efforts
to combat salinity increases in ground and surface water supplies. lId at 19.
While rainfall will vary within regions of the continental U.S., it is unlikely that cur-
rent rainfall patterns will remain the same. It is certain that higher temperatures will in-
crease evaporation and reduce snowpack. The rainfall in the U.S. falls more heavily on the
east than the west and changes in temperature alone will cause new stresses in water re-
source management particularly in the west. Even without rainfall decline higher tempera-
tures alone will likely lead to lower riverflow and lake levels, due to increased rates of
evaporation. Id. at 19. In California, for example, decreased water availability and in-
creased demand for irrigation may intensify conflicts between agricultural and urban use.
Higher temperatures may degrade water quality. This would arise from (a) less water
available to dilute pollutants; (b) enhanced thermal stratification of lakes leading to in-
creased algal production; and (c) runoff and leaching of land caused by increased irriga-
tion. Id. at 20.
92 Bills before the 101st Congress in the Senate and House included:
S. 169, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. 522-24 (1989) ("[t]o provide for a
national plan to improve scientific understanding of the earth and the effect of changes
[the earth] system on climate and human well-being").
S. 201, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. 575-78 (1989) ("[t]o respond to global
environmental degradation brought about by human activities and to ensure that U.S. pol-
icies provide for the protection of the world environment .. ").
S. 324, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. 1034-61 (1989) (to provide for energy
conservation and explore policy options that reduce energy use by 2-4% annually; use of
nuclear energy and clean coal technologies; reforestation; cut carbon dioxide by 20% by
year 2000 in the U.S.; convening of international convention to reduce carbon dioxide by
20% in year 2000 and 50% in year 2015).
S. 333, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. 1069 (1989) (to enact the Global Envi-
ronment Protection Act of 1989).
S. 491, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. 1999-2005 (1989) ("[t]o reduce atmos-
pheric pollution to protect stratosphere from ozone depletion; 20% reduction of carbon
dioxide by 2005 in the U.S.; convening of an international convention to do likewise glob-
ally; energy research; reforestation").
S. 603, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. 2829-40 (1989) ("[t]o establish within
the Department of State, the Office of Global Warming .... ).
S. 676, 101st Cong., 135 Cong. Rec. 3135-45 (1989) (global atmospheric and envi-
ronmental protection).
H.R. 1078, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (to establish national energy conservation
policies and encourage international agreements on conservation).
H.R.J. Res. 207, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (to establish that it is the'policy of the
U.S. to reduce greenhouse gases).
93 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (1988).
94 See supra note 92.
95 Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, § 1102(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (1988).
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concludes that necessary action must be identified and implemented
in time to protect the climate. 96
At an international level, we have noted that there is overwhelm-
ing evidence of an international commitment to a 1992 treaty on
global warming. After dragging its feet, the United States, even
though opposing emission limitations, has now formally recognized
the reality of global warming and climatic change. This Article ar-
gues that a move to reduce carbon dioxide emissions is not against
the self-interest of the United States.
In any event, there are alternatives to self-interest when evaluat-
ing responses to environmental problems. A significant body of U.S.
legislation incorporates well-understood nonutilitarian rationales.
In these laws, there is a clear intention to preserve nature for its own
sake, not merely because of its market value. For example, the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act clearly requires consideration of ad-
verse environmental effects on natural areas, and the preservation of
the "natural aspects of our national heritage."'97 Among the goals of
the Clean Water Act are the attainment of water quality "which pro-
vides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wild-
life." 98 The Clean Air Act contains provisions protecting parks and
wilderness areas. 99 The Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuar-
ies Act of 1972 commits the nation to preserve the "health of the
oceans." 100 The Endangered Species Act of 1973 finds that various
fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States are in danger of extinc-
tion, and seeks to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species depend may be conserved. 1 1 The Act
pledges that the United States, as a sovereign state in the interna-
tional community, will conserve to the extent practicable various spe-
cies of fish, wildlife, and plants facing extinction.' 0 2 The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act contained no exceptions, and required all federal agencies and
departments to ensure that actions authorized, funded, and carried
out by them not jeopardize the continued existence of any endan-
gered species. s0 3 Such U.S. legislation lays the foundation and pro-
vides a powerful alternative argument for U.S. espousal of such
rationales in the international community.
96 Id. § 1102(4).
97 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4) (1988).
98 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1988).
99 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470(2) & 7471 (1988).
100 33 U.S.C. 99 1401 & 1444 (1988).
10 16 U.S.C. 99 1531(a) & (b)'(1988).
102 Id. at § 1531(a)(4).
103 Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). Following the outcome in
TV v. Hill, Congress amended the Act in 1978 to include procedures for exempting
agency actions, in some situations, from rigid compliance. 16 U.S.C. § 1537(7)(e)-(p)
(1988).
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Finally, influential advisors to the President and some econo-
mists feel that the United States should focus on reducing the effects
of global warming, rather than addressing its source. This Article
contends that a problem as monumental as global warming calls for
permanent solutions, which can only be achieved when causes are
found and confronted.
V. Conclusion
When faced with the likelihood of a new Soviet threat, giving
rise to global insecurity in the aftermath of World War II, the west-
ern powers agreed that a credible defense of Western Europe was
necessary. Although the western powers disagreed on how to exe-
cute that commitment, they concurred on the need for action to
avert the threat to security.'04 Despite the easing of tensions, the
need for massive military expenditures to meet a potential threat
continued to be the conceptual linchpin of defense policy. Analysts
who were convinced of the necessity to incur enormous expenses in
guarding against a potential Soviet attack can hardly demand a more
onerous standard of proof from those seeking action against the po-
tentially irrevocable and devastating impact of global warming.
The convergence of the military and energy crises leading to the
Gulf War and the environmental crisis bringing global warming
come at a pivotal moment in history. They dispel any remaining
doubts about the need for redesigning our energy policies. One of
the most important long-term implications of the Middle East crisis
is recognition of the need to shake our reliance on fossil fuels in or-
der to realize energy security. The overwhelming consensus about
the need for ensuring environmental security in the face of global
warming demonstrates that problems which place us in a common
quandary call for common answers. Answers that integrate solutions
both to problems of energy and environmental security are not
merely prudent, but vital.
The United States enjoys unparalleled geopolitical authority.
Almost incontrovertibly, it is the preeminent nation in the world.
Undoubtedly, it is the only country with the military, diplomatic,
political, and economic assets empowering it to become a decisive
player in conflicts around the world, wherever they may be.' 0 5 From
this exalted position, the United States has called for a "new world
order." Such a vision will be tragically distorted unless it rests upon
a tripod of military, energy, and environmental security.
When addressing environmental and energy security, what is
104 This is an obvious point. For a historical survey see Schwartz, A Historical Perspec-
tive, in ALLIANCE SECURITY: NATO AND THE No-FIRsT-USE QUESTION 5-9 U.D. Steinbruner
& L.V. Sigal eds. 1983).
105 Krauthammer, supra note 43, at 24.
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striking in both these areas is the confluence of the domestic self-
interest of the United States and the communitarian interests of the
international community. This situation gives rise to the possibility
of United States environmental lawmaking that leads to, or at least
parallels, international lawmaking. By taking action without waiting
for international solutions, the United States will be displaying the
Congressional commitment to "effective United States leadership in
the international arena."' 0 6 President Bush embraced precisely such
a response, promising in his first year of office to summon at the
White House a global conference on the environment to discuss
ways to control global warming, acid rain, the loss of tropical forests,
and the saving of the oceans.' 0 7 The environmental problems to
which President Bush was reacting have been compounded by the
energy crisis. The way is clear for the United States to forge a genu-
ine new world order addressing the problems of environmental and
energy security. Would that such a vision be embraced.
106 Global Climate Protection Act of 1987 § 1102(6); 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (1988); 16
U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(p) (1988).
107 NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 2.
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